

**The Foccart Networks, *The Secret Businessman...***

Jean-Pierre Bat

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Jean-Pierre Bat, paleograph archivist, was responsible for the "Foccart fonds" at the National Archives. This collection consists of the personal archives of Jacques Foccart and his department at the Elysée Palace, the General Secretariat for African and Malagasy Affairs. The richness of this archival, heritage and historical collection makes it possible to shed light on, and even understand, many of the positions and decisions linked to the African policy of General de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou.

In addition to his writings on the maintenance of order during the colonial period, Jean-Pierre Bat has already written several works on the figure of Jacques Foccart and his famous "networks" <sup>1</sup>with, always in the background, this constant idea of a *Françafrique* that would have continued, at least in the early post-colonial period, to maintain an active French presence and, in any case, more sensitive and more pervasive than the status of formal independence conquered by the former territories of the Empire would suggest. To feed this reality, the existence of efficient and branched networks has become essential. One might therefore have expected, as is often the case when a historian deals with the Foccart case, a work that would have been rather incriminating from several rather classical angles: unbearable interference, defence of the less noble interests of the old metropolis, hindering the endogenous development of the new African nations, etc.

The present work, "Les réseaux Foccart, *L'homme des affaires secrètes*", differs from the classical forms of narrative on decolonization and the early years of African independence to become a kind of portrait of the man Jacques Foccart and his time. It is based on a typescript by the journalist Georges Chaffard, who in 1969 painted a realistic portrait of "Jacques Foccart, *l'homme des affaires secrètes*" and reread it in the light of the archives now available.

And 1969 was a pivotal year. The 1960s faded with the removal of General de Gaulle following the failure of the referendum on decentralization. During the interim of Alain Poher, President of the Senate, at the head of the State (from the end of April to the end of June 1969) while awaiting the election of Georges Pompidou, some "political settling of scores" emerged. Jacques Foccart, who had accumulated certain hatreds on the left and among the centrists, is under attack from all sides, all the more so as still recent scandals such as the sinister Ben Barka affair, which saw the involvement of dubious branches of the secret services, seemed to bear the unmistakable mark of our man in the shadows.

Indeed, under General de Gaulle, Jacques Foccart is Secretary General for African and Malagasy Affairs at the Presidency of the Republic. As "Mr Africa" of the Elysée Palace, he has genuine powers to carry out his mission.

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<sup>1</sup> Le syndrome Foccart: la politique française en Afrique, de 1959 à nos jours, Folio, 2012.

La fabrique des "barbouzes", histoire des réseaux Foccart en Afrique, Nouveau Monde édition, coll " Chronos " 2017.

Jacques Foccart: open archives (1958-1974). La politique, l'Afrique et le monde, (dir.), Presses universitaires Paris-Sorbonne, 2017.

He is also responsible to the President for "overseas intelligence and security affairs and liaison with Gaullist organizations". This almost disparate ensemble makes him "the most daily and influential advisor at the 'Château'". Obviously, in the imagination of the time, it symbolizes the shadowy side of Gaullism, from the turpitudes of French-Africanism to the works of the low police. In 1969, even in the ranks of Georges Pompidou's team, there were many determined opponents of Jacques Foccart and his supposed methods. But Georges Pompidou will keep Jacques Foccart at his side, with most of his former prerogatives. It was under these circumstances that Georges Chaffard undertook to draw a portrait of this mysterious man, about whom, moreover, several close friends and family members agreed to talk to defend him. Georges Chaffard's investigation will appear in three articles in the *Nouvel Observateur* from the end of October to the beginning of November 1969, mentioning the fact that it is a document that will help us understand "the most secretive man in France". But the typescript on which Jean-Pierre Bat worked and which is presented in this book corresponds to a preparatory document containing a number of corrections by Georges Chaffard. This document is the first true biography of the "man in the shadows". Not without criticism of Jacques Foccart, these lines present him essentially as a great clerk of the State, an angle of attack that would be that of Jacques Foccart himself when he would evoke, a quarter of a century later, his career in interviews and memoirs with Philippe Gaillard that would appear under the title *Foccart speaks*.

Returning to Georges Chaffard's investigation, it is curious to note that nothing seems to emanate directly from "Mr Africa" but that, obviously, many elements come from very close to the person concerned. A critical edition of this typescript then takes all its interest, but without the pretension of a true biography. Besides, what was Georges Chaffard planning to do with this job? A third "Secret Book of Decolonization"? No one knows that<sup>2</sup>. As Jean-Pierre Bat writes, it will therefore be, simply, "a backstage tour of the Franco-African Republic in the 1960s, at the time of independence".

Jean-Pierre Bat divided the typescript into chapters allowing critical work on major themes by starting each chapter with an extract from Georges Chaffard's typescript, which the author then comments on using archival sources that were inaccessible at the time<sup>3</sup>.

We begin with a passage - "*Un parfum de scandale*" - which illustrates the difficulty of resisting slander and the effectiveness of the repeated attacks by Jacques Foccart's opponents in this pivotal year 1969. The private man Foccart suffers from it even in his family life (anonymous **threatening** letters, etc.). All the dark cases are attributed to him: the kidnapping of Colonel Argoud in Munich, the failed attack in Pont-de-Seine against General de Gaulle, who is rumoured to have instigated it by mounting a forgery to raise public awareness against the OAS, etc. Novels and film scripts feature the "man in the shadows". Moreover, to avail oneself of Jacques Foccart's friendship would be an unstoppable sesame in Africa to be "introduced". But "how do you explain the solid and detestable reputation of the 'Fouché of the Fifth Republic', who for nearly ten years has been attached to a man whose shyness, fear of journalists and taste for silent action have gradually, rightly or wrongly, created the image of the most mysterious character of the Gaullist regime"?

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<sup>2</sup> Georges Chaffard died in November 1969 as a result of a car accident.

<sup>3</sup> The archives of the General Secretariat of African and Malagasy Affairs, AG/5(F), the archives hidden by Jacques Foccart in 1968 (113 AJ) and the archives of Philippe Lettéron - right-hand man of Jean Mauriceau-Beaupré (90 AJ).

In fact, Foccart made himself General de Gaulle's absolute "political bodyguard" and, as such, was subject to the heaviest attacks, not only from the left but, above all, from the hard right, which reproached him, as early as 1958, for having resisted the temptation of a military coup de force from Algiers to overthrow the Fourth Republic. His policy was inflexible: General de Gaulle "cannot return to power at bayonet point". For many nationalists, he thus became "the evil genius of Gaullism" and it took the amnesty of the condemned in French Algeria in June 1968 for a rapprochement to take place with the nationalist right against a common enemy, the "revolution". But in the 1960s, all fantasies will be given free rein. Because of the anti-American line ardently advocated by de Gaulle and a deliberate recognition of the geopolitical weight of the Soviet Union, Foccart will even be made "a mole infiltrated by Moscow at the highest level of the State"! The fight against the OAS in the years 1961-1962, which had to mobilize dubious elements (parallel police forces, etc.) to defeat the insurrection, left traces that were still fresh a few years later and we will find these uncontrolled elements at work in the course of the Ben Barka affair, many of whom will consider that Foccart was necessarily "in the know". By consulting certain sensitive contents declassified in 2017 among the archives hidden by Foccart in the midst of the May 68 crisis, Jean-Pierre Bat clearly shows his complete lack of compromise in this dark affair and, on the contrary, his direct involvement in the profound reorganisation of the SDECE at the<sup>4</sup> time.

Of course, Foccart is a former member of the ESDEC, but of the Action service, not of the VII service, one of the most discreet and efficient cogs of the ESDEC, composed of "plumbers" and other "honourable correspondents", working with sometimes shady "sources". Foccart is, on the contrary, a military man at heart and has kept away from the dubious manipulations lent to the ESDEC. But we are at the end of the 1960s, May 1968 suddenly made a certain sociability of the former Resistance members who often passed into the secret services at the Liberation seem obsolete. Rightly or wrongly, Foccart appears as the emblematic figure of this generation whose youth dates back to the 1940s and who continues to "cultivate a certain culture born of the Resistance, nourished by the colonial wars and prolonged in metropolitan France in hostility to the Fourth Republic".

And Foccart was suddenly weakened by the presence, around George Pompidou, of young tenors<sup>5</sup> who were "not very open to the former teams of General de Gaulle". But the new President, confident in Foccart and his secretariat for African and Malagasy Affairs, finally keeps them on his side. However, deaf attacks from all sides and hateful caricatures in the press will hardly stop. Foccart initiated many trials, less to exonerate himself than to protect the memory of General de Gaulle, and it was moreover after the General's death in 1970 that he began to regularly hand over to the National Archives a number of documents. With the help of his faithful secretary at the time of the Resistance, Odette Leguerney, he also wrote memoirs which were published after his death in five volumes under the title *Journal de l'Élysée*. In the deluge of writings around Foccart in this troubled year 1969, the investigation of Georges Chaffard, appears as the most serious and documented contribution to the knowledge and understanding of Jacques Foccart's action and, beyond, of the "African heritage of Gaullism".

But who was Foccart, *a.k.a.* "Binot"? He conveyed the most improbable fantasies about his origins, about his family's estates in Guadeloupe, about his real name and his supposed fortune, etc. As Staff Sergeant in 1940, he was not taken prisoner and quickly came into contact with London, where he was registered, as early as 1942, as an agent of the BCRA (Central Bureau of Intelligence and Action) under the name "Binot". It will remain in France

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<sup>4</sup> External Documentation and Counter-Intelligence Service, forerunner of the DGSE (Directorate-General for External Security).

<sup>5</sup> Like Pierre Juillet and Marie-France Garaud or Michel Jobert and Edouard Balladur.

throughout the war and constitutes an "Action" network in Mayenne. In 1944, he had a rank assimilated to Lieutenant-Colonel within the BCRA and, narrowly escaping a German round-up that dismantled his network, quickly recreated another one and took a very active part in activities aimed at hindering the movement of German troops. After an internship in London, he was sent on a mission to Holland. Foccart was certified as a parachutist in 1945, was demobilized as a reserve captain and resumed his commercial activities as an exporter.

But war and a taste for action are founding principles for Foccart, as well as a principle acquired in clandestinity and which will never leave him: that of compartmentalizing one's activities to preserve one's secrets. Another observation: underneath his rather banal physical exterior, the man is courageous and much more athletic than he seems. He still jumps by parachute at an advanced age, does judo with a coach from the 11th Shock and regularly practices pistol shooting. Finally, he will cultivate, very deeply, the friendships born of the Resistance.

Although he had always been reluctant to enter politics personally, his qualities quickly made him stand out by the authorities at the Liberation. In December 1944, he was a founding member of the "Amicale Action", noticed by Soustelle and Chaban-Delmas.

And all this in the service of an absolutely unshakeable *Gaullist faith*. In 1947, Foccart joined the National Council of the RPF (Rassemblement du peuple français). In 1948, he became President of the Overseas Territories Commission, National Delegate for the DOM-TOM in 1949 and Councillor of the French Union in 1952. In 1954, he replaced Louis Terrenoire as Secretary General of the RPF.

Above all, in 1953, with Colonel de Bonneval, General de Gaulle's aide-de-camp, he accompanied the General on an African tour which included a meeting with Félix Houphouët-Boigny. A confident friendship between the two men began at a time when Houphouët-Boigny was still only the rather radical president of the GDR (African Democratic Rally), "facing the hostility of conservative European elements". In 1956, another trip with Olivier Guichard and Bonneval to accompany the General to the West Indies and the Pacific.

We can already measure the singular and rapid career of Foccart, hero of the discreet Resistance, but no less discreet businessman easy through the SAFIEX, a commercial company he created during the war and which will always ensure his financial independence but will also make him some shade. Undoubtedly the period was troubled, sometimes requiring "cover" for genuine actions against the enemy, which nevertheless raised doubts among some witnesses and led to delicate legal actions in the immediate post-war period, all of which were extinguished for lack of sufficient evidence..

Foccart showed genuine open-mindedness during the votes in the Assembly of the French Union by approving the proposed reforms, while demanding, however, that order be maintained. But it must be seen that this great firmness, which would make him now appear to be tough and quick to act underground and definitive, was the prerogative of many politicians of all stripes at the time. Yet, once again, only Foccart seemed to crystallize on his person all the criticisms against the politics and methods of Gaullism. Jean-Pierre Bat believes that the work of Georges Chaffard does a good job of weighing this up. And the author to show Foccart's mastery and prudence when it comes to choosing his men to serve the General. His military friendships, strengthened during frequent "periods", enabled him to keep the necessary contacts. Pompidou will also be able to appreciate the particularities of this independent man - a little like him in the end - who managed to arrive masterfully in the foreground under de Gaulle without having been part of the "first circle" of London.

During the events of May 1958, Foccart was efficient and wise. He will be one of the safe and well-informed intermediaries, skillfully distilling the General's "position" at all times from the RPF headquarters in rue de Solférino<sup>6</sup>. He knew how to help Gaullists, who were sometimes very "alluring", to avoid overly militaristic options and excesses, and de Gaulle appreciated this man who had a good sense of his deepest thoughts.

Of course, from the moment he joined the Hôtel de Matignon in June 1958 as technical advisor to the President of the Charles de Gaulle Council, in charge of liaison with the secret services, he became *the man of the shadows* par excellence! In fact, de Gaulle chose Foccart, a former colonel in the "Action" service, to solve two seemingly contradictory problems at the SDECE: on the one hand to deal with a staff that was too much like an "anti-Gaullist socialist civil servant" since the elimination of Colonel Passy in 1946 and, on the other hand, to control an Action branch that was becoming considerable and almost uncontrollable in its merciless struggle against the Algerian FLN's arms suppliers.

In 1959, Charles de Gaulle took Jacques Foccart with him to the Elysée Palace, retaining his current devolutions and adding responsibilities in African politics. But Foccart was to go one step further during the Algerian events of 1960 to 1962 (the "barricades", the military putsch of April 1961, the OAS), when his know-how enabled him to arbitrate intelligently between two clans: the "old" Gaullist networks of the Resistance and the new teams working in Africa. Within this framework, SAFIEX and its international ramifications can render multiple functions, both to a party (the RPF) and to secret services satisfied with the multiple contacts made by Foccart. The "wartime attitude" takes precedence over almost any other consideration when it comes to gauging someone. His faithful runners-up for Africa (Marcel Chaumien, Raymond Bichelot and Bob Maloubier in particular) will not escape this selection criterion.

But General de Gaulle, once he has turned the page on Algeria and subversive warfare, wants to devote himself to nuclear defence while keeping the situation in Black Africa under control. The creation of the liaison and intelligence posts (PLR), by decision of Prime Minister Michel Debré in 1959, will enable the ESDEC to extend its powers to the Member States of the Community. Personalities such as Maurice Robert and Jean Mauriceau-Beaupré assisted Jacques Foccart in setting up the PLRs (there were soon to be twelve of them, housed in the premises of the African presidencies) in the various newly independent capitals at the turn of the 1960s. A *Françafrique* is thus established, an intermediate notion between colonies and nations that would be completely disconnected from the former metropolis.

Debré held Matignon - and thus all the secret services - firmly until 1961, and Foccart concentrated on Black Africa, preventing the "disintegration" of this group. This is not easy with an Africa destabilized by the situations of Cameroon and the former Belgian Congo and a Guinea led by "the young and boiling Sékou Touré". For the two dossiers of direct interest to France, the result is not very glorious and "the *hand of the SDECE*" will not always have been happy. Attempts to destabilize or even eliminate Sékou Touré failed for sometimes grotesque reasons, and it is proven that Foccart had little faith in the success of such operations; General de Gaulle will never forgive the "services" for having taken him, de facto, into such adventures. As for the lamentable elimination of Félix Moumié, leader of the UPC (Union of Cameroonian Populations), opposing President Ahidjo, it is seen at the Elysée Palace as "a c...ie". The ESDP needs to be taken back in hand. It will be entrusted to Foccart.

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<sup>6</sup> Initially, "Solferino Street" was the headquarters of the RPF (and the SAC) and not the headquarters of the Socialist Party. The latter only moved to rue de Solférino - at another address of course - after François Mitterrand's victory in the 1981 presidential elections.

On these burning issues, Jean-Pierre Bat dissects precisely the details that cause cases that are by nature complicated to fail when the services become plethoric (all the more so as we are still in the middle of the Algerian affair): multiple implications, diplomats who can't do it but, too much latitude left to sub-orders, etc.

The next section, on *Katanga*, can be seen as "the first field of action of the 'Foccart team', where ESDP agents will only act to provide resources or relays". This would be, no more and no less, an attempt by France to take a close interest in "Congo Leopoldville" by not considering as null and void "the rights granted to France over the Congo by the Leopold II-Jules Ferry agreements of 23 and 24 April 1883"! At the beginning of 1960, the wealth of Katanga also arouses the covetousness of the French and the English of Rhodesia and all this annoys the Belgians. In 1961, France's attempt to place a French chief of staff (Colonel Trinquier) at the head of the Katangese army failed. The events in Algeria will force Foccart to put his Congolese business on hold. However, some mercenary officers manage to impose themselves in the close entourage of Moïse Tshombé, president of the ephemerally independent Katanga. All this will end in 1963 with the end of Katanga's independence.

Returning to Algeria, Jean-Pierre Bat shows that Foccart was not directly responsible for the fight against the OAS (Secret Armed Organisation). Indeed, Foccart could not (did not want to), as Secretary General for the Community, be the chief "*barbouze*" of violent actions, obviously at the limit of legality, even in a merciless struggle against factionalists who themselves have few scruples. Recruitment to defeat the OAS will not be exemplary and many unsavoury characters will be found in the dark cases of the future involving, among others, the SAC.

Little by little, even if his direct involvement is not proven, Foccart will be considered the new "*Father Joseph of the <sup>Fifth</sup> Republic*". It is also true that, more and more, Foccart appears as the confidant, the "guardian of the temple", the one who is able to thwart all attempts to destabilize Gaullism. As a man of power and a person who is listened to - and also because in difficult times he has shown himself to be the bravest - his contacts are obviously effective and increasingly maintain the myth of the existence of networks of influence. International literature takes hold of him: the British novelist Frederick Forsyth publishes *Chacal*, the story of an OAS plot against the General, in which Foccart appears as the one who, at the highest level, shows the extent of his power. A much-needed power to watch over the General, both for his security and his reputation.

With the OAS threat dwindling, *Franco-Africa* will be back at the top of its agenda. Most black heads of state will maintain with Jacques Foccart, a character who is sometimes shy and avoids "giving lessons", relationships of great trust and real friendship. He understood their almost filial attachment to de Gaulle and their need to "count" on someone. On the other hand, everyone knew that Foccart would never deviate from the General's true line. His African interlocutors therefore knew perfectly well who they were talking to when they were with Foccart, that they could count on him and that France would not be a "foreign" country. This psychological factor played a major role in the functioning of *Françafrique* - a neologism that would have been created by Houphouët-Boigny.

What will, moreover, make the success of the character Foccart at the Elysée Palace is, almost against all expectations, that he will be very careful - he is from the "private" sector, not from the seraglio - not to offend the officials of the Quai d'Orsay or the Administration in general. But it is not his fault if he knows his files better than successive ambassadors or ministers of cooperation!... Jean-Pierre Bat clearly shows that the African Heads of State had themselves understood that it was necessary to be in tune with the times, between the functioning of

old-style chiefdoms and modern management: in 1969, French-speaking Africa could appear to function better than the African Commonwealth. Finally, Foccart's way of organizing his work and meetings, of treating his guests (often at home, where they were received as dear friends) explains the overall success of this discreet man.

As for the *doctrine* underlying Foccart's action, Georges Chaffard summed it up in three points: (i) there are serious and capable leaders in Africa; France can support them unreservedly; (ii) other leaders are less strong or their countries are more fragile; interventions in their favour will necessarily be limited; (iii) but, if subversion threatens, "then the French apparatus is on alert". Jean-Pierre Bat believes that this doctrine worked on the whole in the 1960s, with the exception, through a combination of unfortunate circumstances, of the overthrow of the faithful Fulbert Youlou in Congo Brazzaville in 1963. France took precautions a little later, in 1964, in Gabon, during the failed putsch against Léon M'Ba.

The *first Chadian war* was prepared, in January 1969, without improvisation, because things had been going badly for a long time in Fort-Lamy. President Tombalbaye, ill and after bad choices (notably the progressive dismissal of many French military cadres) is forced to ask for France's help against the rebels. General de Gaulle studied the case and refused, arguing that a simple military intervention without a general restoration of order in the country would be useless. Chad accepted in March 1969. Jean-Pierre Bat reviews all the many vain attempts to put things in order since 1963, with the help of friendly African partners (Houphouët-Boigny, Tshombé). And then "May 1968" comes to trouble the spirits. The stalemate ensued and Foccart was aware of the limits of a purely military engagement. In 1973-1974, Tombalbaye became bogged down in repression alone and was overthrown in 1975.

This is followed by a series of inserts in which Georges Chaffard evokes the last upheavals of an era.

*Bob Denard* is the very type of mercenary adventurer, not lacking in panache and professional enough to achieve some striking but ephemeral successes when the political fate of the ex-Belgian Congo changes almost daily and the CIA and the South Africans get involved.

*Biafra* is another example where France in the 1960s hoped to play a major role. In 1967, the General asked Foccart to "do something for this brave little people" towards whom several African friends of France seemed to be well disposed: English-speaking Nigeria seemed to them to be already acquiring a very worrying power, especially with the oil ... extracted essentially in Biafra ... Soon there was talk of genocide against the Christians of Biafra (war and famine killed more than a million people) and the French services were active in sending military equipment and humanitarian means to Biafra. But the secession was bogged down and, in 1969, President Pompidou no longer wanted to hear about this conflict.

What about the famous "*Foccart networks*" for Georges Chaffard? The Quai d'Orsay, which has never taken Africa seriously (at least at the time), does not support interventions of the kind to be undertaken in Biafra. Moreover, the ambassadors of France in the 1960s did not come from the "career" but were often quite original and old people of the Free French. It is in this sense that we can already speak of "Foccart networks". The General Secretariat for African and Malagasy Affairs in the rue de Grenelle is much more welcoming than the Foreign Affairs and Jacques Foccart is still a man whom de Gaulle met *every evening, for a quarter of an hour*, to talk about Africa, which is not the case for the Africa directors at the Quai! And it is also true that the agents of the "Foccart networks" know how to get their hands dirty when they need to, just like - it should be noted - the Americans or the Russians.

Jean-Pierre Bat stresses that Foccart allows himself to act within this pragmatic framework because (i) he can rely on the absolute confidence of the Head of State, (ii) he has a perfect command of and respect for the institutional apparatus and (iii) he maintains close "interpersonal relations" with the political actors in Africa.

As Jean-Pierre Bat points out, this last point is the foundation of Foccart's character. He never talks like a schoolmaster to his pupil. At the end of his life, in 1994, Mobutu said: "What distinguishes Jacques Foccart from other 'friends' is that he speaks to you as a friend. And, I don't know, maybe because he knows my character, never when he talks to you do you feel he's interfering in Zaire's problems. He says to you, 'President, this is not seen well from the outside. If you keep going down this road, it's not going to be okay'. He speaks to you as a friend".

Foccart spoke only once, in 1995, on France 2, about what he meant by "network". It was very simple, it was a "set of relationships that he had created with European traders, with industrialists, in Africa, with Africans of all categories and subsequently with African heads of state, constituting a network. But I don't call it a network. " Of course, it's a little more complex, but the philosophy is good. And Jean-Pierre Bat describes the multiple functional cogs, still based on safe relationships from the battles of the past.

Finally, SAC is addressed. Let us say that we will never prevent a very small number of people in any organization from taking advantage of situations to enrich themselves or increase their power, especially when that organization is branched out and opaque. The SAC will disappear from his excesses.

The "*Foccart affair*" of April-May 1969, days when everything seemed to be slipping away under Jacques Foccart, is linked to all the faults committed around him and often in his name. Jealousy too, of course, at such a personal achievement. All the most vile turpitudes will be blamed on him. But he will be reborn again and again, even with slightly reduced devolutions during each right-wing mandate, Jacques Chirac being particularly attached to him. Françafrique will, of course, evolve, but will continue in what it implies of a special relationship between two parties who ultimately have common interests and shared memories.

Jean-Pierre Bat's book is original and demanding, as it is read on three levels: extracts from Georges Chaffard, current developments of Jean-Pierre Bat from currently known archives, and a number of intermediate testimonies from actors of all kinds and from all periods.

But this difficult and rigorous work is exciting and delivers two keys to understanding the relationship between France and French-speaking Africa.

On the one hand, France-Africa is not a relationship made up of constraints and power struggles between two unequal parties. It is an attempt to perpetuate special relationships between countries that have much in common in a fractured world. It is also an expression that France is not really a foreign country...

On the other hand, what was built in Africa and in the French overseas territories under General de Gaulle and his successors was made possible by an exceptional man, who had his shadowy areas, who was not tender with his adversaries but who always showed absolute loyalty to General de Gaulle and his African friends, an unfailing love of France and, under debonair and almost unremarkable exterior, a very great physical and moral courage. So, his networks... Let's just say he had a lot of followers!

This text is written by Jean-Pierre Listre.

